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LIST OF PARTIES 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., is the Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Katherine Wentland Gorrell, 
deceased. 
Robert E. Gorrell was the husband of Katherine Wentland 
Gorrell, deceased, and is the Respondent herein. 
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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals error by disturbing the 
District Court's findings of fact that Petitioner establish-
ed a prima facie case that Katherine Wentland Gorrell owned 
certain money found in a heart shaped beauty box following 
her death? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals error by requiring Peti-
tioner to introduce evidence of the source of the money, as 
well as the fact that of its possession by Katherine 
Wentland Gorrell, to establish a prima facie case that 
Katherine Wentland Gorrell owned the money? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals improperly place the 
burden of proof on Petitioner? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, Robert Gorrell, and his now deceased 
wife, Katherine Gorrell, were married on the 17th day of 
November, 1961, and ever since said time, until the demise 
of Katherine Gorrell, on the 4th day of May, 1984, at the 
age of eighty (80) years, Respondent and Katherine Gorrell 
lived together as husband and wife, constituting a marriage 
of twenty-two (22) years and six (6) months. (Tr. 5 8 ) . 
The Respondent, Robert Gorrell, testified at the trial 
that the Respondent had worked practically the whole time of 
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his marriage to the deceased, Katherine Wentland Gorrell. 
(Tr. 60, 62, 66, 70-73, 75-76, 90-91, 107-108). 
A few days following the demise of Katherine Gorrell, 
the Appellant, Robert E. Gorrell, was rearranging the cup-
boards in the kitchen so that he could work around the range 
and around the counter sink due to his being confined to a 
wheelchair, having lost both his legs. The Respondent 
discovered in a small blue agate roasting pan a heart shaped 
beauty box that contained approximately $43,000.00, the 
money in question. (Tr. 8 6 - 8 7 ) . 
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On M a r c h 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , J u d g m e n t w a s r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t t h e 
R e s p o n d e n t , in t h a t t h e R e s p o n d e n t had a l l e g e d l y f a i l e d to 
s u s t a i n a b u r d e n of p r o o f in e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e c a s h 
a s s e t w a s c r e a t e d e i t h e r in w h o l e or in p a r t f r o m a s s e t s 
c o n t r i b u t e d by t h e R e s p o n d e n t , t h e r e f o r e t h e t r i a l C o u r t 
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awarded the entire sum of $43,748*00 as an asset of the 
estate of the decedent and required the Respondent to imme-
diately turn over to the decedent's estate any unused por-
tion of the $43,748.00 in Appellant's control, and further 
ordered the Appellant not to dispose of, in any way, any 
assets purchased in whole or in part from the $43,748.00 
discovered in decedent's home. (R. 42, 43) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the District 
Court's Judgment, thereby effectively awarding the money to 
Mr. Gorrell. Gorrel1 y. Gorrell, 740 P.2d 267 (Utah Appel-
lant 1 9 8 7 ) . The Court of Appeals ruled that First Security 
Bank had not presented a prima facie case that Mrs. Gorrell 
owned the cash at the time of death, id at 269, and further 
found that the lower or District Court had improperly placed 
the burden of proof on Mr. Gorrell. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD DENY 
PETITIONER'S WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS 
LACKING PROPER CHARACTER OF REASONS 
UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court entitled 
"Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari"1 deals with 
jurisdiction of a writ of certiorari from the Court of 
3 
Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Rule indicates that 
reivew by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but 
of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there 
are special and important reasons therefore. The Rule then 
goes on to indicate some of the basis which indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered in granting a 
writ of certiorari to review a Court of Appeals decision. 
The first reason is as follows; 
(1) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same i ssue of law;. . . 
In the instant case, Petitioner has failed to cite this 
Court in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to any conflict 
which this Court of Appeals decision has with the decision 
of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue 
of law and therefore certorari should not be allowed on this 
basis. 
The second reason indicated is as follows: 
(2) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this 
Court;... 
The instant case involves no interpretation or a deci-
sion of a question of state or federal law, but simply deals 
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with ascertaining on the appellant level who has or had the 
burden or proof. Therefore, the writ of certiorari should 
not be considered on this point. 
The third reason indicated by Rule 43 is as follows: 
(3) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower Court as to call for an 
exercise of this Court's power of super-
vision; or... 
In this case, the panel of the Court of Appeals has 
simply exercised its discretion based on other case law as 
to which party bears the burden of proof as to ownership and 
thereupon reversed the decision of the lower Court, and 
having properly applied that standard or burden of proof to 
the facts found by the lower Court Judge, rendered a deci-
sion in favor of Respondent herein, such that the Court of 
Appeals did not depart from the accepted usual course of 
judicial proceedings and the writ of certiorari should not 
be considered on the third basis of Rule 43. 
The fourth consideration of Rule 43 states as follows: 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of munici-
pal, state or federal law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by this 
Court. 
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There are no important questions of municipal, state or 
federal law in the immediate case at hand and therefore the 
writ of certiorari should not be considered on this basis. 
WHEREFORE, based on Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court as cited above and with regards to the Peti-
tioner having previously petitioned for a rehearing, which 
was denied, this Court should deny Petitioner's writ of 
certiorari as lacking in the jurisdictional grounds and 
allow, the decision of the Court of Appeals to stand. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS IN 
LINE WITH THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ADOPTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated tha appellant Courts 
must afford great deference to the factual findings by a 
trial Court, unless the trial Court has misapplied the law 
or i ts findings are clearly against the weight of evidence. 
Garcia vs Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ; First 
Security Bank o± Utah V_L Hall, 504 P.2d 995 (Utah 1 9 7 2 ) . 
The Court of Appeals found that the trial Court had 
misapplied the law at 740 P.2d 270, wherein it indicated 
"under those circumstances, there being no prima facie case 
of ownership by the bank, it was error for the trial Court 
to impose on the Appellant the burden of proving ownership 
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of the cash." The Court of Appeals analysis did not substi-
tute its own assessment of the facts, but simply found that 
the trial Court had erred in imposing on the Appellant or 
the Respondent herein, the burden of proving ownership of 
the cash, and that when that burden was properly applied, 
the factual situation led the Court of Appeals, after givinq 
proper deference to the District Court's factual findings, 
to reverse the Judgment of the trial Court. 
The Petitioner cites this Honorable Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Gray' s Harbor Lumber Co. v. Burton 
Lumber Co., 236 P. 1102 (Utah 1925) as indicating that the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that once the representative of 
a decedent's estate establishes prima facie evidence, that 
the property was owned by the decedent at the time of death, 
the burden of proving title to the property shifts to the 
party asserting an adverse claim. The Court of Appeals in 
this case specifically held that the bank had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of ownership which is supported 
by the trial Court's finding that "there is no way I can 
determine which of those, or which combination of those 
events occurred" and that the bank established that the 
decedent owned the home in which the couple lived, and that 
the Appellant or Respondent herein had no prior knowledge of 
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the hidden cash. The Court of Appeals further held that no 
"other evidence" sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
of evidence was presented. "On the contrary, Appellant and 
decedent lived together in decedent's home for over 22 
years. There was also no evidence the roastinq pan, in 
which the money was found, was owned exclusively by the 
decedent. The Court of Appeals further pointed out, based 
on the trial Court's findings, that decedent worked for only 
three or four years after the marriage and then retired, 
receiving approximately $225.00 per month in social se-
curity. The Appellant however made significant financial 
contributions to the marriage. He worked full time for most 
of the marriage and delivered all of his income to the 
decedent who handled the family finances." 
There was no proof of possession of the cash consti-
tuting any prima facie evidence of ownership as required in 
Gary's Harbor, supra, therefore, the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly found that the trial Court had misapplied the law in 
placing the burden of proof on the Appellant or Respondent 
herein when a prima facie case of ownership was not estab-
lished by the Petitioner. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING IS NOT 
CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW. 
Petitioner has cited this Honorable Court to the case 
of Gary's Harbor Lumber Co. v. Burton Lumber Co., supra, 
wherein this Court held that a prima facie case of ownership 
of cash was established by proving possession of the cash. 
Respondent's position, as well as that of the Court of 
Appeals, is that the case law in the State of Utah remains 
the same and that possession would establish a prima facie 
case of ownership. The Court of Appeals, in referring to 
the Bi ckford case, found that the "other evidence" which 
amply presented a prima facie case of ownership in the cash 
in the Bickford case included the decedent's exclusive 
ownership of the dress in which the cash was found, dece-
dent's income through her own business, and the absence of 
contributions to the household income by the Respondent. 
The Court of Appeals went on to hold, in the instant case 
involving the Gorrells, that there was no "other evidence" 
which amply presented a prima facie case of ownership of the 
cash and therefore First Security Bank was required to 
produce evidence of the course of the money in order to 
establish the prima facie case of ownership, which would 
then shift the burden to the Respondent herein of proving 
ownership of the cash, all of which is in compliance with 
Utah State law. 
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Even the District Court found that there was an equal 
likelihood that the source of the money was Mrs. Gorrell's 
solely or Mr. Gorrell's solely or both Mr. and Mrs. 
Gorrell's, and the trial Court concluded that "there is 
absolutely no way I can determine which of those, or which 
combination of those events occurred." This, in effect, is 
the finding by the District or lower Court that the movant 
or Petitioner herein failed to establish a prima facie case 
of ownership leading to the conclusion that the burden of 
proof was improperly placed on the Respondent herein, all of 
which is in accordance with Utah State law. 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE BY THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT IS NOT IMPORTANT 
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF UTAH CASE 
LAW. 
Rule 43 of the Utah Supreme Court, as previously cited 
in topic I, indicates four (4) basic reasons, although not 
exclusive as a basis for reviewing a decisin of a panel of 
the Court of Appeals through a writ of certiorari. As cited 
above, the Petitioner has failed to establish any of those 
reasons and therefore the writ of certiorari should be 
denied. 
This case does represent the important issue of how 
claims of ownership of personal property, especially cash, 
could be resolved in probate proceedings. But contrary to 
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the position of the Petitioner, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals has not undermined prior Utah case law, but has 
actually reaffirmed that position, indicating that if pos-
session cannot be established, as in this case and as found 
by the trial Court, then the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of ownership rest upon the movant claiming owner-
ship of the property. The Court of Appeals actually follows 
prior Utah Case law as cited by the Petitioner. To require 
the Utah Supreme Court to consider this case under these 
circumstances in a discretionary manner, would defeat the 
purpose of an intermediate Court of appeals and therefore 
the writ of certiorari should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner, First Security Bank's writ of cer-
tiorari for review by this Court of a decision of the Court 
of Appeals should be denied as lacking proper discretionary 
consideration, in that the Court of Appeals decision is 
consistent with prior rulings of this Court and that the 
Court of Appeals, acting as an intermediate appellant Court 
has applied this prior Court's rulings and held that the 
trial Court misapplied the law and under reassessment and a 
proper application of the factual findings of the trial 
Court, held that the Petitioner had failed to establish a 
11 
prima facie case of ownership, and that the burden of proof 
had been improperly placed upon the Respondent herein or the 
Defendant in the trial Court. 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 1987. 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
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